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Although many papers have already proposed empirical models of currency crises, the 
timing of such crises has received relatively little attention so far. Most papers use indeed a static 
specification and impose the same lag structure across all explanatory variables. This, by 
construction, prevents from specifically timing the crisis signals sent by the leading indicators. 
The objective here is to fill this gap by considering a set of dynamic discrete choice models. The 
first contribution is to identify how early in advance each explanatory variable sends a warning 
signal. Some indicators are found to signal a crisis in the very short run while others signal a 
crisis at more distant horizons. The second contribution is to show that state dependence matters, 
albeit mostly in the short run. The results have important implications for crisis prevention in 
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Non-technical summary 
The financial crises that swept emerging markets in the past decades have now been analyzed 
through a variety of empirical models. These models seek to statistically relate the occurrence of 
crises to lagged variables, which play the role of early warning indicators. Such indicators 
include, for instance, debt and liquidity ratios, current account and government deficits, indicators 
of private sector imbalances, contagion, and so forth. As financial crises are a relatively rare 
event, these models are usually estimated with a panel of emerging markets in order to have 
enough observations. In spite of important differences between each other (in terms of country 
coverage or specific econometric technique), most existing models share two noticeable 
characteristics. First, they are static models (the lagged dependent variable does not enter the 
equation) and second, they assume that all dependent variables enter the specification at the same 
lag. The aim of this paper is to test these two assumptions and to propose a framework within 
which they can be relaxed. 
The first contribution of the present paper is to introduce a dynamic specification to model 
financial crises. Indeed, most existing models rely on a static specification, based on the 
assumption that the probability of a crisis in a given country is independent of whether this 
country has been hit by a crisis before. However, this assumption seems very unlikely, both in the 
short and in the long run (in technical words, there can be state dependence). Although the 
proposition that the occurrence of crises in the past can influence the likelihood to observe crises 
in the future may appear relatively intuitive, it has not been formally tested so far. In addition, the 
direction of the effect is not immediately clear. In the short run, the effect could indeed run both 
ways. On the one hand, if a crisis translates into a large proportion of liquid investment flowing 
out, it is unlikely that capital outflows happen again immediately afterwards (all the funds have 
been moved out); in this case, the lagged dependent variable would have a negative sign. On the 
other hand, a crisis may indicate that a country is more vulnerable than investors had initially 
thought, and induce those who have not done so yet to withdraw their investments, therefore 
increasing the risk of a future crisis; in this case, the lagged dependent variable would have a 
positive sign. In the long run, the effect could again work in both directions: a country that is 
accustomed to crises can be deemed inherently more vulnerable by investors while, by contrast, a 
country that has been hit by a crisis may benefit from higher vigilance by policy makers and 
investors, thus avoiding further crises. The question of state dependence has obvious policy 
implications: it would mean that, ceteris paribus, countries that have been hit by a crisis in the 
past may be, as a result, more (or less, depending on the sign) vulnerable. 
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country fixed effects using a conditional logit model. The two issues mentioned above (state 
dependence and individual effects) are closely related, as mentioned in particular by Heckman 
(1981a). This can be seen by considering the hypothetical case of two countries A, which is often 
affected by crises and B, which does not experience crises, the two countries being otherwise 
identical (they have similar fundamentals). In this example, it is hard to know whether the 
difference between A and B is due to (unobserved) idiosyncratic differences that make A 
inherently more vulnerable than B, or whether A’s repeated crises are due to the fact that the first 
crises made A subsequently more vulnerable to future crises. This suggests that results on state 
dependence should be interpreted with caution. 
The second contribution of this paper is to investigate the time horizon at which different 
indicators signal a crisis. Indeed, most existing models assume that the impact of all explanatory 
variables materialises at the same lag. This assumption can be questioned: for instance, one 
would expect that structural problems have an effect in the long run, whereas liquidity problems 
can materialise in the shorter run. This issue seems to have been overlooked by the existing 
literature, although it also has important policy implications. Often, policy actions taken at a 
given time can have an effect only in the medium to long run (e.g. reforms of the banking sector), 
whereas other types of action will yield an effect immediately (e.g. borrowing reserves). 
To investigate the two issues above, the present paper uses a dynamic discrete choice (logit) 
model. Specifically, the dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a country 
experiences a crisis and 0 otherwise, while the lagged dependent variable also appears on the 
right-hand side. The paper also discusses the common practice of using a forward index, 
indicating the presence of a crisis in a given time window. In addition, more lags of the 
explanatory variables are tested on the right-hand side than usually done in the literature. Results 
indicate that liquidity measures such as the short-term debt to reserves ratio and contagion both 
have a very short-run impact (four and six months, respectively), whereas a measure of banking 
sector fragility such as the so-called lending boom variable has a longer-run impact (about a 
year), and a measure of over-appreciation an even longer-run impact (two years). Finally, results 
also indicate that the lagged dependent variable enters the specification with a significant and 
positive sign, especially in the short run, which suggests that vigilance must not weaken after a 
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However, the estimation of state dependence is complicated in the presence of idiosyncratic 
effects. The motivation for such effects comes from the fact that no model, no matter how rich, 
can take all country characteristics into account. Individual effects can then arise if there are some 
non-observable characteristics at stake. The present paper therefore investigates the role of  
1. Introduction   
The currency crises that swept emerging markets in the past decades can be understood in various 
ways. By definition, they involve a large nominal and real depreciation of the domestic currency, 
but they are often also characterized by a “current account reversal”, to use the terminology of 
Milesi-Ferretti and Razin (1996), as well as a “sudden stop” of international financial flows, to 
use the terminology of Calvo (1998)
1. These phenomena actually represent different aspects of 
the same process: investors have lost confidence in the ability of a borrowing country to repay its 
debt, they refuse to roll over the debt and decide to withdraw their investment. This triggers a 
capital outflow (Calvo’s “sudden stop”), a large depreciation and ultimately a large adjustment of 
the current account. In addition, crisis episodes also involve a change in domestic saving and 
investment.
2 
Currency crises have now been analyzed through a variety of empirical models, most of which 
consider a binary variable (equal to 1 if there is a crisis, 0 otherwise), which they try to explain 
using a set of relevant fundamentals.
3 The set of independent variables typically includes, among 
others, debt and liquidity ratios, current account and government deficits, indicators of private 
sector imbalances, contagion, and so forth. They can be transformed into “signals” when they 
cross a threshold (see Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1998a, b, 1999, 2000) or used as continuous 
indicators, in which case probit and logit models are a popular choice. As currency crises are a 
relatively rare event, these models are usually estimated with a panel of emerging markets.
4 
In spite of important differences between each other, most papers on the subject share two 
noticeable characteristics: first, they are static models (the lagged dependent variable does not 
enter the equation) and second, they assume that all dependent variables enter the specification at 
the same lag. Each of these two characteristics can be questioned. First, using a static model 
relies on the assumption that the probability of a crisis in a given country is independent of 
whether this country has been hit by a crisis before. However, this assumption seems very 
unlikely, both in the short- and in the long run; in other words, there can be state dependence, 
although the direction of the effect is not intuitively clear and needs to be formally tested. In the 
short run, the effect could indeed run both ways. On the one hand, if a crisis translates into a large 
proportion of liquid investment flowing out, it is unlikely that capital outflows happen again 
immediately afterwards (all the funds have been moved out). In this case, the lagged dependent 
variable would have a negative sign. On the other hand, a crisis may indicate that a country is 
more vulnerable than investors had initially thought, and induce those who have not done so yet 
                                                           
1 See also Calvo, Guillermo, Izquierdo and Mejia (2004), and Calvo and Talvi (2005). The expression refers to the 
saying “it is not speed that kills, it is the sudden stop” and was previously used in this context by Dornbusch, 
Goldfajn and Valdes (1995). 
2 As noted in Gruber and Kamin (2005) for the Asian countries and in Calvo and Talvi (2005) for the Latin American 
countries, the adjustment mainly took place through investment, rather than saving. 
3 Exceptions include Sachs, Tornell, Velasco (1995) and Bussiere and Mulder (1999a,b), who use a continuous 
dependent variable.  
4 See Berg and Pattillo (1999) and Berg, Borenzstein and Pattillo (2004) for a review. 
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to withdraw their investments, therefore increasing the risk of a future crisis. In this case, the 
lagged dependent variable would have a positive sign. In the long run, the effect could again 
work in both directions: a country that is accustomed to crises can be deemed inherently more 
vulnerable by investors while, by contrast, a country that has been hit by a crisis may benefit 
from higher vigilance by policy makers and investors, thus avoiding further crises.
5 The question 
of state dependence has obvious policy implications: it would mean that countries that have been 
hit by a crisis in the past may be, as a result, more (or less, depending on the sign) vulnerable. 
The second characteristic of existing models, which assume that the impact of all explanatory 
variables operates at the same lag, can also be questioned. Indeed, one would expect for instance 
that structural problems in the economy (such as deficiencies in the banking sector) have an 
effect in the long run, whereas liquidity problems can be expected to have an impact in the 
shorter run. 
The aim of the present paper is to revisit these two assumptions. The issue of the lagged 
dependent variable is tackled using for the first time in the context of currency crises a dynamic 
discrete choice model. This has not been attempted before although a recent working paper 
(Georgievska et al., 2006), indicates that this issue should be tackled in future research.
6 Such 
models were developed in particular by Heckman
7 and further enhanced by Honoré and 
Kyriazidou (2000). Their basic insight is that not only independent variables, but also the lagged 
dependent variables, are relevant: omitting to account for possible state dependence can yield 
biased estimates. However, the estimation of state dependence is complicated in the presence of 
idiosyncratic effects, as what appears to reflect state dependence may in fact reflect the presence 
of (unobserved) individual effects, which Heckman (1981a) refers to as “spurious state 
dependence”. The motivation for idiosyncratic effects comes from the fact that no model, no 
matter how rich, can take all country characteristics into account. In the present context, 
individual fixed (country) effects may reflect non-observable characteristics like, for instance, the 
openness of a country to foreign investment, the specificity of its political system or its legal 
institutions, etc.
8 The present paper therefore investigates the role of country fixed effects using a 
conditional logit model. The two issues mentioned above (state dependence and individual 
effects) are closely related. For example, if a country is characterized by a large number of crises 
(for given vulnerability indicators), one may think that this is due to either (i) the fact that the first 
                                                           
5 See for instance Bernanke (2005): “In response to these crises, emerging-market nations were forced into new 
strategies for managing international capital flows.(…) For instance, (…) some Asian countries, such as Korea and 
Thailand, began to build up large quantities of foreign exchange reserves. (…) These “war chests” of foreign reserves 
have been used as a buffer against potential capital outflows”. 
6 “Another recommendation for future research concerns the specification of the econometric model itself. E.g. one 
could model a dynamic discrete choice model, in order to account formally for state dependency effects” (p. 10). 
7 A thorough discussion of discrete choice models can be found in Heckman (1981a, b, c). Heckman (1981a) 
discusses the relation between heterogeneity and state dependence (see in particular p. 150 onwards) and refers to 
earlier work on the issue. 
8 Some attempt has been made at estimating the role of political variables in a cross-sectional context, see for 
instance Bussière and Mulder (1999a). However, although political variables can increase the goodness of fit of the 
model, substantial cross-country heterogeneity remains and calls for the use of fixed effects. 
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crisis rendered this country more vulnerable to future shocks or (ii) that an unobserved 
component makes this country more prone to crises. In order to account for this possibility, this 
paper presents results from four specifications: a static model, a dynamic model, a static model 
with fixed effects and a dynamic model with fixed effects. Results indicate that positive state 
dependence matters (there is a risk for a given country to experience crises repeatedly), but only 
in the short run (less than a year). In addition, one needs to use either fixed effects or a dynamic 
model: both yield results similar to each other, and different from the simple static model. It 
seems also that the fixed effect model may be preferred to the dynamic model to avoid the 
spurious dependence result. 
The second intended contribution of the present paper is related to the time length at which 
vulnerability indicators impact the dependent variable. This issue seems to have been overlooked 
by the existing literature, although it also has important policy implications. Often, policy actions 
taken at a given time can have an effect only in the medium to long run (a typical example is debt 
issuance, another is reforms of the banking sector), whereas other types of action will yield an 
effect immediately (e.g. borrowing reserves). Results indicate that liquidity measures such as the 
short-term debt to reserves ratio and contagion both have a very short-run impact (four and six 
months, respectively), whereas a measure of banking sector fragility such as the so-called lending 
boom variable has a longer-run impact (about a year), and a measure of over-appreciation an even 
longer-run impact (two years). 
The fact that lags can be long or short also influences the way one intends to “predict” currency 
crises. If the aim is to predict the precise timing of crises, the estimation must be made by using 
the left-hand side crisis index at time T and lagged explanatory variables. However, this goal 
appears to be very difficult to reach
9, so that one may have to go for a second best and attempt to 
predict whether crises can happen in a given time window (e.g. one year), by using a forward 
index
10. Bussiere and Fratzscher (2006)
11 thus used a transformed crisis index equal to one in the 
12 months preceding crises and asked a related but different question: are economic fundamentals 
different in these 12 months than at other times? The present paper discusses and compares these 
different approaches. Overall, there seems to be a trade-off: using a forward index improves the 
goodness of fit, but this comes at a cost, since inference on the timing is lost. Using a 
contemporaneous index therefore complements the other approach as it allows tackling issues 
such as state dependence and the timing of the various early indicators, but comes with the cost of 
a lower goodness of fit. The results presented here have important policy implications. First, state 
dependence suggests that vigilance must not decrease after a first crisis has happened as it may be 
                                                           
9 See also Peltonen (2006) and the references therein. 
10 “Forwarding” the crisis index in order to define a time window is relatively common in the literature on financial 
crises, see for instance Fuertes and Kalotychou (2004) as well as the references therein. 
11 In fact the paper used three regimes in a multinomial logit framework, which was shown to increase the fit of the 
model compared with a two-regime model. While this technique proved useful to obtain a good fit, it does not 
specifically address the issue of state dependence and does not allow for different time lags across explanatory 
variables, which are the two objectives of the present paper. 
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followed by other crises. Second, some indicators signal crises in the very short run, which calls 
for a particularly quick policy response. This is the case of the short-term debt to reserves 
liquidity ratio and of financial contagion.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the data and sketches some 
stylized facts; Section 3 reviews the dynamic discrete choice models; Section 4 presents the 
results based on a raw crisis index and Section 5 the results based on the transformed crisis index; 
Section 6 concludes. 
 
2.  Presentation of the sample and stylized facts 
2.1.  The sample: 27 countries, 7 years of monthly observations 
As crises are a relatively rare event, a country by country estimation would rapidly run out of 
degrees of freedom. Using observations across different countries and throughout time allows one 
to find common characteristics across crisis episodes: Brazil experienced a so-called “lending 
boom” before it succumbed to the Tequila crisis in 1995, but was the lending boom really 
responsible for the crisis? The other indicators usually included in early warning systems might 
have been a potential culprit too. To answer this question, we need to check whether other crisis-
affected countries also experienced a “lending boom” before a crisis, controlling for other factors. 
The aim of the exercise is therefore find “common empirical regularities” across crises. Such 
common regularities must not be confused with true causal relationships, which would be very 
difficult to establish, as already noted in Peltonen (2006). Pooling together the experience of 
several countries increases the number of observations but comes at the cost of imposing slope 
homogeneity across countries or regions.
12 
Increasing the number of observations by increasing the number of countries and the time length 
of the data allows testing for more variables, but it comes at a cost: the countries considered need 
to be sufficiently homogeneous that we can reasonably expect to find common fundamentals 
behind crises. In the current context this yields a panel of 27 countries listed in the country 
Appendix (see Table 9). The data are at a monthly rather than quarterly frequency as currency 
crises sometimes unfold in a couple of weeks. Estimation results start in 1994M1 because the 
period immediately before saw two important mutations that could seriously bias the results: 
firstly many Latin American countries moved away from hyperinflationary regimes, and secondly 
many Eastern European countries were still proceeding with transition towards a market 
economy. In spite of this rather late start the panel is still unbalanced because some of the 
countries that emerged from the former USSR went through a period of adjustment characterized 
                                                           
12 Several papers have tested for slope homogeneity. For instance, Bussiere and Fratzscher (2006) run out-of-sample 
forecasts where they include only observations until the Asian crisis and check whether the estimated model can 
explain subsequent crises. The good out-of-sample performance suggests that the same model applies to different 
countries/episodes. Peltonen (2006) finds differences between Latin America and Asia, but his sample goes back to 
the 1980s. The present sample is more homogeneous as it considers the 1990s only. 
10
ECB 
Working Paper Series No 713
January 2007 
by high instability of the exchange rate that cannot be confused with the kind of currency crises 
experienced by the other countries. Overall, estimations are computed over roughly 2000 
observations. 
 
2.2  Definition of the variables 
A currency crisis is usually defined as a sharp depreciation of the exchange rate.
13 However, it 
also refers to situations when pressure on the exchange rate is so high that it leads to a strong rise 
in interest rates and/or to a loss in international reserves. Here, the dependent variable, CI (for 
crisis index) refers to the second definition and is computed in two steps. In the first step, a so-
called “exchange market pressure index” is calculated as a weighted average of the change in the 
real effective exchange rate, in reserves and in real interest rates (see Appendix)
14. Second, this 
variable is transformed into a binary variable using as cut-off point two standard deviations. 
Transforming a continuous variable into a discrete one obviously involves a loss of information. 
However, this comes with the advantage that the (by now very comprehensive) theoretical 
framework of discrete choice models can be used. In addition, the loss of information may not be 
so large if non-linearities are present in the data
15 (which turns out to be the case here) and if the 
underlying continuous variable is noisy. 
The variables used as early warnings are defined as follows. The first variable is the debt ratio. 
Debt ratios appear to be among the most often used indicators of currency crises, in particular the 
ratio of short-term debt (as defined by the Bank of International Settlements) to international 
reserves: the higher short-term debt, the higher the probability that the borrower will default.
16 In 
the same way, the lower the level of international reserves held by the monetary authorities, the 
more difficult is will be for the authorities to defend the value of a currency in case of an attack. 
The appropriate way to scale these two variables is to use the so-called Greenspan-Guidotti ratio 
(defined as short-term debt divided by international reserves). A rise in this ratio can come from 
either a rise in debt or a drop in reserves, which is exactly what the “Greenspan-Guidotti rule” 
states: reserves should entirely cover the amount of debt that can be sold short-term by investors 
in case of an attack. A long-term debt ratio can be computed in the same fashion. 
The second variable is the current account, which has been identified in a number of papers as a 
key variable for the analysis of crises in emerging markets (see in particular Milesi-Ferretti and 
Razin, 1998). The current account needs to be scaled to account for the different size of the 
economy; the approach chosen here consisted in scaling the current account balance with GDP. 
The third variable is the government budget balance which, like the current account balance, is 
                                                           
13 According to Wikipedia, “a currency crisis (also known as a financial crisis) occurs when the value of a currency 
changes quickly, undermining its ability to serve as a medium for exchange or a store of value”. 
14 See also Frankel and Rose (1996), Sachs, Tornell and Velasco (1996) or Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1996) 
for a discussion of crisis indices. Market pressure indices were first introduced by Girton and Roper (1977). 
15 I am grateful to H. Lütkepohl for pointing this out to me.  
16 See for instance Bussiere, Fratzscher and Koeniger (2006) for a theoretical and empirical investigation. 
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divided by GDP. A large government deficit could signal a crisis based on Generation I models 
of crises (Krugman, 1979). The fourth variable measures the extent of the real exchange rate 
over-appreciation before a crisis. To investigate this issue, over-valuation was defined as 
deviation of the real effective exchange rate
17 from a linear trend.
18 
The fifth variable is the so-called “lending boom” measure. It is designed to capture weaknesses 
in the financial system. As the exact number of non-performing or bad loans in the economy is 
not directly observable for obvious under-reporting reasons, the literature has searched proxies. 
The so-called “lending boom”, that measures the increase of the credit to the private sector (CPS) 
over a 2 or 3 year period, can be useful in this respect (see Tornell, 1999). Here the measured is 






















































                                                   (2) 
The sixth variable is the real growth rate. The growth rate of the real GDP is a crucial variable 
because it is more likely that a government lets the currency devalue in case of low growth for at 
least two reasons. First a slow-growing economy has fewer resources to defend itself against an 
attack, and second political economy reasons will make it more likely that the government 















=                                               (3) 
The seventh variable used in the present study attempts to account for contagion across emerging 
markets. The contagion variables used here follow the definition of Fratzscher (1998). Contagion 
across countries is a well-known fact, and is assumed to take different channels, among others 
financial and trade linkages. As the former are generally found significant whereas the latter are 
not (see Bussière and Fratzscher, 2006), the present paper focuses only on financial contagion.
19 
Finally, the predictive power of market based indices was also tested. Do financial markets 
anticipate crises? Face value evidence would tend to show the opposite, as the Asian crisis for 
instance was largely unexpected. To test whether market values of key stock indices (here, 
Datastream indices) can provide any information, this paper tests variables equal to a 12 month 
                                                           
17 See Desruelles and Zanello (1997) for a description of the methodology. 
18 Several alternative measures have been used, such as the deviation from a quadratic trend or simply the rate of 
change in the preceding 12 or 24 months, with broadly similar results. 
19 See also Pesaran and Pick (2006) for a recent analysis of contagion, with a focus on European interest rate spreads 
during the ERM crisis. 
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percent change of three indices: a broad market index, and two sub-indices on banks and financial 
institutions. 
 
2.3. Stylized  facts 
Independent variables 
Before turning to the model, let us gain evidence from stylized facts by looking at the variables 
outlined in the preceding section. Table 1 below presents the values of these variables on average 
(column 1), and compares these values with the average computed one year before crises (column 
2), and outside crises (column 3).
20 





T-1 to T-12 
(3) 
Average 
T-13 to T-24 
Short-term debt / reserves  83.68 103.58  103.24 
Current account / GDP %  -1.44 -2.84  -2.85 
Government balance / GDP %  -1.36 -0.85  -0.86 
Real effective exchange rate / trend %  0.75 6.92  5.71 
Lending boom %  17.75 37.37  22.63 
Growth rate %  4.20 3.39  4.38 
Financial contagion  0.37 1.39  -1.30 
Datastream Index, Banks  23.49 13.25  31.63 
Datastream Index, Market  27.77 13.24  27.92 
Datastream Index, Financial Institutions 20.84 9.23  28.76 
Trade balance / GDP %  -3.58 -5.03  -5.34 
Total debt (locational concept) / reserves  176.22 214.27  215.64 
Total Debt (consolidated Concept) / reserves %  158.36 201.23  196.09 
Reserves, 12 months growth rate  0.20 0.16  0.24 
Reserves over exports, 12 months growth rate  0.09 0.07  0.07 
 
Three key lessons can be learnt from Table 1. First, looking at Column (1), one can notice that 
the 27 countries included in the table are relatively fast growers since their growth rate was on 
average equal to 4.2% in the period covered in the sample (starting 1994M1). Their reserves 
covered most of short-term debt (although the average figure hides important differences between 
very open countries like in South East Asia or Latin America and countries like India, China, and 
some Eastern European countries). They generally ran moderate current account (-1.44%) and 
government (-1.36%) deficits. 
The second lesson to draw from the table arises by comparing column (1) (average values) and 
(2) (average in the 12 months preceding the crisis). The picture of a typical crisis country 
emerges as follows:
21 its exchange rate is markedly over-appreciated with respect to trend, its 
                                                           
20 Further detail on how the variables were computed can be found in the Country and Data Appendix. The values of 
Table 1 differ from Table 11 in Bussière and Fratzscher (2002), because the samples are different –in the latter, only 
the values of 20 “core” countries, more open to foreign investment. It is noteworthy that including countries like 
India has a sizable effect on the average debt to reserves ratio. 
21 Of course one should be cautious in interpreting these numbers are they represent an unconditional correlation. 
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current account and trade balances record a deficit, the levels of its short-term and long-term debt 
are above the level covered by international reserves. The government deficit on the other hand is 
not necessarily larger: it is now a well established fact in the literature that crisis-affected 
countries did not have larger government deficits (in fact many of them had government 
surpluses). The higher value of the lending boom variable indicates that the crisis countries 
probably experienced excessive bank lending in the period prior to the crisis. The Datastream 
indices show that the market values of banks and especially financial institutions are moderating, 
similar to the markets as a whole. 
The third lesson to draw from the table arises from the comparison of column (2) and (3). One 
striking feature is that the problems identified in the previous paragraph often date back longer 
than generally perceived. For variables like the debt ratios, the current account deficit, or 
exchange rate over-valuation, the deterioration occurred already in the period between 12 and 24 
months before the crisis. For other variables, the deterioration happened in the 12 months 
preceding the crisis, sometimes even at a shorter lag; this is the case of the growth rate, the 
“lending boom”, and the market indices.  
The dependent variable 
The dependent variable CI was defined in section 2. The Appendix shows as an example the 
charts for some of the countries included in the sample; each chart plots the exchange rate index 
and the corresponding binary crisis index (CI). Three countries have never experienced a crisis: 
Hungary, Latvia and the Slovak Republic. Many of the East Asian countries experienced only 
one crisis whereas many Latin American countries experienced more than one crisis.  
 
3.  Dynamic discrete choice model: presentation of the model 
The object of this section is not to introduce new considerations on logit models but to present the 
models that will be estimated in the following two sections. It closely follows Wooldridge (2001) 
and Baltagi (2001), and proceeds sequentially by discussing the basic static model (1), individual 
effects (2) and the dynamic model (3). 
3.1.  Basic review of binary-variable models 
Let us first detail the notation that will be used in the rest of this section.  
Introductory notation 
The sample contains N countries i={1,2,…N}, observed during T periods t={1,2,…T}. Each 
observation is then a country/month. The aim of the model is to estimate the probability that a 
crisis happens, i.e. that the crisis index equals one. This probability is noted P:
22 
                                                           
22 Time and country indices are omitted in this section to simplify notation. 
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Y
1 ) 0 Pr( 0
) 1 Pr( 1
                      (4) 
A set of K independent variables are observed across the N countries and the T periods; they are 
collected in a matrix X whose dimension is therefore NT*K. In a static model the objective is to 
estimate the effect of the indicators X on the probability P of a crisis Y. Let us denote γ the vector 
of K marginal effects: 
' dX
dP
= γ                                                            (5) 
As the first, simplest model is the linear probability model, let us review it briefly before turning 
to the logit model. 
The linear probability model 
In a linear probability model, P is a linear function of X: 
β β X X F P = = ) (                                                     (6) 
in which β is a K*1 column vector of parameters and X includes a constant term. Thus: 
ε β + = X Y                                                         (7) 
In the linear probability model the effect of the indicators on the probability of a crisis is 
therefore linear (marginal effects are equal to the coefficients): 
β γ = =
' dX
dP
                                                       (8) 
 
The logit model 
Probit and logit models are generally similar so the choice between them is a matter of 
convenience. Since the logistic distribution has fatter tails than the cumulative normal it seems 
more appropriate for an application to currency crises in view of the stylized facts outlined in 
section 2. In addition, as next section will use fixed effects, which is possible in a logit model but 
has no counterpart in a probit model, estimation uses a logit model. 












) ( ) 1 Pr(                                      (9) 
 
Equation 9 shows that the independent variables have a non-linear effect on the probability that a 
crisis bursts out. This property of the model makes it well suited to deal with currency crises 
because the theoretical literature, evidence from stylized facts and traditional wisdom among 
policy makers suggest the presence of strong non-linear effects. One key assumption is that the 
variables used as indicators are exogenous; the present paper therefore follows standard practice 
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3.2. Individual  effects 
The reason for country effects 
  In spite of the great care exercised in selecting homogeneous countries and a large set of 
variables, the presence of country effects is still likely. Some characteristics of the different 
countries included in the sample are not observable, or not easily captured in the various variables 
one can compile. Two examples can illustrate this point. First, some countries impose restrictions 
on their capital account that may have consequences on their ability to avoid crises. One could go 
in search of a proxy but it is not clear how effective it will be. A second example relates to 
political economy considerations. Politically unstable countries are known to be more prone to 
crises. In fact there is some empirical evidence of this fact, as demonstrated in Bussiere and 
Mulder (1999) that tests a set of political variables. However, even these political indicators 
cannot capture everything: the judicial system, contract enforcement, law and order, or other 
institutional characteristics may be relevant to explaining the occurrence of crises. As a 
consequence of the omission of such elements, the model can permanently underestimate or 
overestimate the probability of a crisis in a given country. 
 
Fixed and random effects 
  Individual (country) effects can be incorporated into the model by using fixed or random 
effects. As the two names suggest, fixed effects assume that the country effect is “fixed” and 
estimable, whereas random effect assume that country effects have a distribution. With fixed 
effects only the “within” information is used in the model (losing the “between” information); see 
Wooldridge (2001), Chapter 15, for a discussion. Although random effects represent a more 
efficient combination of within and between information, they come at a cost: random effects 
models assume that the country effects are not correlated with the independent variables. This 
assumption seems over-stretched here: if the political setting or capital account openness are 
relevant to crisis vulnerability, we might also expect that they have an influence on the other 
variables, particularly the current account deficit, the level of public debt, or the state of the 
financial sector. For this reason fixed effects appear to be a better choice. 
 
The conditional logit model 




















) , | 1 Pr(                                       (10) 
In traditional panel data (i.e. when the left-hand side is not binary), fixed effects can be estimated 
using country dummies (a least square dummy variable model), using deviations from country 
specific means, or computing differences. In the case of the logit model a convenient solution 
was proposed by Chamberlain (1980), who suggested maximizing the conditional likelihood 
function:
23 
                                                           
23 The discussion follows Baltagi (2001), p. 206. 
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The intuition for this approach can be understood with the simple example in which T=2. As the 
example is now debated in many textbooks, let us sketch the reasoning below. There are four 
possible sequences: {(0,0), (0,1), (1,0), (1,1)}. The two sequences (0,0) and (1,1) do not 
contribute to the likelihood because trivially: 
( ) ( ) 1 2 | 1 , 1 0 | 0 , 0
2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 = = + = = = = + = = i i i i i i i i Y Y Y Y P Y Y Y Y P         (12) 
What remains is therefore the observations for which the outcome has changed (as usual using 
fixed effects): 
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= = + = =                    (14) 
The two probabilities expressed in (13) and (14) are a function of the independent variables only, 
the country effects cancelling out. In a probit model the country effects would not cancel out. On 
the other hand a probit model would allow for random effects, but these methods become 
computationally difficult for large T (here T is above 80), and above all random effects assume 
that country effects are not correlated with independent variables, which does not seem 
reasonable in the present context.
24 
 
3.3  Dynamic discrete choice model 
The framework outlined in the previous section can be extended to a dynamic model. Several 
contributions have played a role. First, Chamberlain (1985) extended the model to lagged 
dependent variables but no exogenous variable. Honoré and Kyriazidou (2000) extended 
Chamberlain’s fixed effects logit to the case where there are also exogenous explanatory 
variables. Denoting Pi
0 the probability to observe the initial period outcome Yi
0 , we have: 
 
( ) ( ) i i i i i i X P X Y P α α , ' , ' | 1







































,..., , , ' | 1                           (16) 
 
The assumptions of the model by Honoré and Kyriazidou are the following: the variables in X are 
strictly exogenous, the errors are IID with a logistic distribution and independent of X, of the 
fixed effects and of the initial value of variable Y. They propose an estimation method for the 
                                                           
24 If, as argued above, fixed effects arise because of government regulations such as capital account restrictions, 
some of the explanatory variables are very likely to be affected, like the current account. 
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case when the panel contains only four observations per unit and consider extensions to the more 
general case of longer panels and to the case with more than one lag of the dependent variable. 
However, this extension is subject to some assumptions, in particular on the explanatory 
variables, which are not satisfied here.
25 
The general formulation by Heckman (1981) is more encompassing. Adapting the notation to the 


























i EMPI L G Y Y X EMPI ε λ γ β                (17) 
In equation (17) the first two terms were defined previously. The third term corresponds to state 
dependence: in the words of Heckman “this term is introduced to capture the notion that, once an 
individual is in a state, an accumulation process begins”.
26 The last term was introduced in the 
Heckman model to capture the notion of habit persistence, the utility level playing the role of the 
EMPI here, G(L) denoting a general lag operator of order H. As this fourth term is difficult to 
interpret in the context of currency crises, it will be left out in the empirical section. Similarly, the 
third term will not be included here
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3.4.  Heterogeneity and state dependence 
One of the key contributions of Heckman (1981a, b, c) was to show that the issue of 
heterogeneity across units interferes with the question of state dependence. Indeed, his study on 
the job market of married women showed that when heterogeneity is neglected, the effect of past 
choices is overstated. To take an example from the present context, Brazil is a country that is 
known to have experienced repeated crises, whereas Hungary has never had one - in the sample 
described in section 2. To which factors should one attribute this difference? First of all, the 
exogenous variables included in the estimation should control for the countries’ fundamentals. 
Second, country fixed effects capture those characteristics that are omitted or non-observable. 
Third, the lagged dependent variable aims at incorporating state dependence. Yet, clearly, the last 
two elements (fixed effects and state dependence) are difficult to disentangle. 
 
                                                           
25 See also Kaiser and Kongsted (2004) for a recent application and discussion. 
26 Heckman (1981a) p. 122. The way crises have been defined (see also charts in the appendix) implies that crises are 
typically separated rather than appearing in succession so the notion of accumulation in states is not directly relevant 
here. 
27 As argued in the conclusion, this can be pursued in future research. 
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4.  Results based on a contemporaneous crisis index: a month-to-
month model 
To address the issues outlined in Section 3, Section 4 proceeds sequentially. It starts from a static 
model (1), then introduces fixed effects (2), then moves to the dynamic model without fixed 
effects (3), before combining a dynamic model with fixed effects (4). The reason of this 
sequential approach is to show that the conclusions differ substantially if fixed effects are omitted 
or when the model is made dynamic.  
 
4.1.  Evidence from the static model 
Table 2 presents the results obtained with a sub-sample of the variables in the database, 
independent variables being lagged one month. Column (1) includes on the right hand side the 
independent variables used in the core model of Bussière and Fratzscher (2002). Although the 
sample and the dependent variable are different, all the coefficients have the correct sign and are 
significant at the conventional levels. The two exceptions are the current account and the growth 
rate, but that should not come as a surprise in view of the stylized facts outlined in Section 2: 
whereas Bussière and Fratzscher (2002) focus on a relatively long period of time (12 months), the 
results presented in Table 2 are performed on a short horizon (a month-to-month forecast).  
Columns (2) and (3) show that long-term debt ratios are informative as well. The results obtained 
with locational and consolidated debt are very close, so there is no evidence to support the 
general view that the latter concept is more informative than the former (as was put forward on 
the eve of the 2001 Argentine crisis). 
Column (4) shows that the government budget balance enters with a positive sign in the equation 
and is significant at the 10% level. A positive sign implies that a higher surplus increases the risk 
of a crisis, a somewhat counter-intuitive outcome that contradicts first-generation types of crises 
(Krugman, 1979). This fact is well documented and has been recognized as a failure of 
Generation I models to explain the crises in the 1990’s successfully (Krugman, 1998). This fact 
could however indirectly support Generation II models (Obstfeld, 1984), in which political 
economy considerations and moral hazard play an important role. 
The last three columns test the relevance of stock indices: for the whole market (5), for a sub-
index on banks (6), and for a sub-index of financial institutions (7). The coefficients on all three 
variables enter the equation with the expected (negative) sign but do not cross the 10% 
significance level. Contagion was excluded from this regression to avoid multi-collinearity (the 
lending boom, which indirectly measures the health of the financial sector, could also possibly 
interfere with the indices; yet, removing it did not change the conclusion). 
Overall, a higher deviation of the exchange rate from its trend, a faster “lending boom”, higher 
debt to reserves ratios, as well as contagion from other financially integrated countries increase 
the probability of a crisis; conversely a rise in the current account surplus (a reduction of the 
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deficit), and stronger domestic growth reduce the probability of a crisis. The next question to 
investigate is how these conclusions are affected by the use of a dynamic model and by the 
presence of fixed effects. 
 
Table 2: Results using the static model with no fixed effects. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 




















































- - - - - 
Total debt / 
Reserves (consoli- 
dated concept) 
- -  0.003 
0.001*** 

















- - -  0.082 
0.046* 
- - - 








- - - 




- - -  -0.010 
0.015 
- - 












































#  obs  1931 1931 1931 1866 1444 1373 1373 
Pseudo R
2  0.059 0.057 0.064 0.054 0.045 0.067 0.069 
Log  likelihood  -208.03 -208.48 -206.87 -204.11 -164.27 -151.82 -151.62 
Independent variable is the crisis index defined in Section 2. Standard errors in small font, robust 
estimates using countries as clusters *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level 
respectively.  
 
4.2.  Evidence from the static model with fixed effects 
Before turning to the dynamic model, Table 3 shows the results performed with the same 
variables as in Table 2 using the fixed effect (conditional logit) model. A likelihood ratio test led 
to the rejection of the hypothesis that all country fixed effects were equal to zero (although the p-
value of the test was close to 10%). Not all the 27 countries in the sample are kept in the 
conditional logit model because those countries that never experienced a crisis are dropped out 
(the country effect perfectly explains the 0 outcome). One striking outcome is that results are very 
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close to those of Table 2: the variables that were significant in Table 2 are also significant in 
Table 3, the coefficients being most of the time not significantly different from each other. 
However, some important differences arise. For instance, in the first column, the coefficient of 
short-term debt is twice as high using the fixed effect model compared with the standard model. 
In addition, the coefficient of the current account becomes significant when using fixed effects, 
which shows the importance of taking into account fixed effects when estimating such models. 
 
Table 3: Results using the static model with fixed effects. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 



















































- - - - - 
Total debt / 
reserves (cons. 
concept) 
- -  0.006 
0.002*** 

















- - -  0.158 
0.120 
- - - 


















- - -  -0.008 
0.005*** 
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- - - -  -0.014 
0.005*** 
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Number of groups  22  22  22  22  18  17  17 
#  obs  1655 1655 1655 1587 1438 1367 1367 
Log  likelihood  -164.75 -164.15 -162.85 -163.34 -129.93 -119.34 -118.95 
Independent variable is the crisis index defined in Section 2. Standard errors in small font, robust 
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4.3.  Evidence from the dynamic model, no fixed effects 
To see the effects of working with a dynamic model, Table 4 shows the results performed with 
the same variables as in Table 2, and including up to six lags of the dependent variable (more lags 
were not insignificant). 
 
Table 4: Results using a dynamic model, no fixed effects. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 



















































































































































- - - - - 
Total debt / 
reserves (consoli- 
dated concept) 
- -  0.003 
0.001*** 

















- - -  0.051 
0.060 
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- - -  -0.006 
0.005 
- - 




- - - -  -0.011 
0.005** 
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#  obs  1919 1919 1919 1854 1441 1370 1370 
Pseudo R
2  0.091 0.089 0.097 0.077 0.108 0.122 0.121 
Log  likelihood  -197.36 -197.64 -195.98 -195.52 -153.48 -142.99 -143.17 
Independent variable is the crisis index defined in Section 2. Standard errors in small font, robust 
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The lagged dependent variable is significant only at lag 5 and 6. The correct interpretation of this 
result is of course not that crises always repeat themselves every 5 to 6 months, but rather that a 
few crisis episodes showed a specific pattern of a first crisis, followed by a second one six 
months afterwards. This clearly appears in the charts presented in the Chart Appendix: for 
Argentina in 2001, for Brazil following the 1995 Tequila crisis and in 1998, for Mexico at the 
end of 1994 and at the beginning of 1995, for Thailand and Indonesia in 1997/1998. In each case, 
one crisis followed another at an interval of around 6 months. Typically, in these instances, a first 
crisis is followed by a period of exchange rate overshooting, and then by a second, decisive crisis. 
Similarly as with the introduction of fixed effects, moving to the dynamic model has important 
consequences for the estimation results. In particular, the coefficient of the lending boom is no 
longer significant. Overall, however, these results are not very helpful in making predictions: first 
because the explanatory power is very low, and second because this six month interval does not 
fit for all countries (it would be misleading to believe that all crises happen this way, sometimes 
the interval is shorter, sometimes longer). Yet, an interesting feature of currency crises can be 
learnt through this exercise (the fact that crises can happen at a short time distance from each 
other). 
 
4.4  Evidence from the dynamic model with fixed effects 
Results of a dynamic model with fixed effects (Table 5) confirm the lessons learnt in the 
regressions presented in Tables 2, 3 and 4: the coefficients of the lending boom and of the 
contagion variables are no longer significant (as in Table 4), while the coefficient of the current 
account variable is now significant (as in Table 3). Intuitively, one can guess why the current 
account enters the regression significantly when using fixed effects: compared to the other 
variables, the current account tends to be relatively sluggish, especially at a monthly frequency, 
implying that a lot of the between information is actually driven by the fixed effects. One 
therefore needs to use the fixed effect estimator to fully capture the impact of the current account 
on the crisis variable. The reason why the coefficient of the lending boom variable is no longer 
significant is by contrast more difficult to explain at this stage, but will become clear in section 
4.5. 
 
4.5  Evidence from the standard model with lags 
Last, Table 6 presents results using a standard logit model (static, without fixed effects), using 
many different lags (the coefficients and standard errors are presented in Chart 1 for four key 
variables). Specifically, the regression with the variables of the first column of Table 2-5 is run, 
changing the lags of the independent variables from 1 month to 24 months. The aim is to see 
whether results change a lot with longer lags. 
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Table 5: Results using a dynamic model with fixed country effects (conditional logit). 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 





















































































































































- - - - - 
Long-term debt / 
reserves (consoli- 
dated concept) 
- -  0.007 
0.002*** 

















- - -  0.164 
0.125 
- - - 














DS index, total 
market 
-  - -  -0.007 
0.005  - - 




- - - -  -0.013 
0.006*** 
- 






















Number of groups  22  22  22  22  18  17  17 
#  obs  1649 1649 1649 1581 1438 1367 1367 
Log  likelihood  -157.46 -155.62 -154.24 -155.66 -123.00 -113.78 -113.34 
Independent variable is the crisis index defined in Section 2. Standard errors in small font, robust 
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Table 6: Results using a standard model with increasing lags. 




CA/GDP Contagion Growth 
Lag 1  0.034  0.006  0.004  -0.007  0.043  -0.036 
 0.013***  0.002***  0.002***  0.022  0.020**  0.030 
Lag 2  0.041  0.006  0.005  -0.010  0.043  -0.022 
 0.013***  0.002***  0.001***  0.023  0.021**  0.031 
Lag 3  0.052  0.005  0.004  -0.011  0.043  -0.009 
 0.014***  0.002***  0.002**  0.023  0.021**  0.032 
Lag 4  0.063  0.004  0.003  -0.008  0.046  -0.012 
 0.014***  0.002***  0.002*  0.024  0.021**  0.032 
Lag 5  0.076  0.004  0.002  -0.005  0.056  -0.009 
 0.14***  0.002***  0.002*  0.024  0.020***  0.032 
Lag 6  0.073  0.003  0.002  -0.005  0.057  -0.011 
  0.014***  0.002**  0.002 0.024 0.020***  0.032 
Lag 7  0.074  0.003  0.002  -0.002  -0.034  -0.010 
  0.014***  0.002*  0.002 0.024 0.022*  0.032 
Lag 8  0.074  0.003  0.002  -0.002  0.038  -0.010 
  0.014***  0.002*  0.002 0.024 0.022*  0.032 
Lag 9  0.072  0.004  0.002  -0.002  -0.001  0.019 
  0.015***  0.002**  0.002 0.025 0.027  0.032 
Lag  10  0.076  0.003 0.001 0.004 0.013  0.032 
  0.015***  0.002*  0.002 0.025 0.026  0.033 
Lag 11  0.069  0.003  0.002  -0.003  0.019  0.033 
  0.015***  0.002*  0.002 0.026 0.026  0.033 
Lag  12  0.070  0.003 0.001 0.002 0.012  0.024 
  0.015***  0.002*  0.002 0.026 0.027  0.033 
Lag  13  0.079  0.002 0.001 0.008 -0.017  0.020 
  0.015***  0.002 0.002 0.026 0.030  0.033 
Lag  14  0.078  0.000 0.000 0.011 -0.039  0.014 
  0.016***  0.003 0.002 0.026 0.032  0.032 
Lag  15  0.078  0.000 0.001 0.006 -0.042  0.003 
  0.016***  0.003 0.002 0.027 0.032  0.033 
Lag  16  0.076  0.000 0.001 0.008 -0.038  -0.009 
  0.016***  0.003 0.002 0.026 0.031  0.033 
Lag  17  0.074  0.000 0.001 0.011 -0.030  -0.016 
  0.015***  0.003 0.002 0.026 0.030  0.033 
Lag  18  0.071  -0.001  0.001 0.010 -0.029  -0.015 
  0.016***  0.004 0.002 0.026 0.030  0.033 
Lag  19  0.070  -0.001  0.001 0.009 -0.028  0.001 
  0.016***  0.004 0.002 0.027 0.031  0.033 
Lag  20  0.065  -0.001  0.001 0.010 -0.040  0.009 
  0.016***  0.004 0.002 0.026 0.032  0.033 
Lag  21  0.062  -0.001  0.001 0.013 -0.063  0.007 
  0.016***  0.003 0.002 0.026 0.033** 0.032 
Lag  22  0.059  -0.001  0.001 0.013 -0.070  0.000 
  0.016***  0.003 0.002 0.026 0.033***  0.033 
Lag  23  0.056  0.000 0.001 0.014 -0.056  0.006 
  0.017***  0.003 0.002 0.026 0.033*  0.033 
Lag  24  0.048  -0.001  0.001 0.012 -0.034  0.019 
  0.017***  0.003 0.002 0.027 0.032  0.033 
Independent variable is the crisis index defined in Section 2. Standard errors in small font, 
robust estimates using countries as clusters *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 
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The outcome is very clear: some variables have a very short-term impact, such as the short-term 
debt to reserve ratio, some have both a very short-term and a longer term impact (such as the 
contagion variable), some have a short- to medium-term impact (such as the lending boom), some 
always seem to have an impact (such as the exchange rate), while for growth and the current 
account, no impact can be detected. The results make sense intuitively. The short-term debt 
variable has a short-run impact almost by definition (short-term debt is defined as debt below six 
month maturity), while an exchange rate over-appreciation can develop over several years before 
translating into a full-fledged crisis. One implication is that a “signal” sent by a high short-term 
debt to reserve ratio may indicate that a crisis is imminent, leaving very little time for policy 
makers to act. By contrast, an exchange rate over-appreciation may not signal a looming crisis 
and can be addressed by longer-term measures. 
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This section has demonstrated that different specifications can yield diverging conclusions. When 
fixed effects are not taken into account, some variables do not enter the model significantly, 
whereas they do when country effects are included. The current account deficit is one example. 
This effect probably arises because some countries are outliers: for instance, Singapore always 
runs a very large current account surplus (perhaps linked to its size and geographical situation), 
and experienced one crisis in 1997. If the number and importance of such outliers are large 
enough, they may drive the results. 
Using a dynamic panel also has important consequences that can best be seen comparing Table 2 
and Table 4 (none of the results included in these two tables use fixed effects to isolate the effect 
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of using a dynamic panel). The “lending boom” is an example of a variable that is significant in a 
static model but not in a dynamic framework. As mentioned in Section 2 the “lending boom” 
variable is an indicator with a short-run effect, so including even as few as six months of the 
lagged dependent variable could partly pick up the effect of this variable.
28 In the case of the 
contagion variable, the fact that the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable is significant at 
lag 5 and 6 may explain why the contagion variable is not significant in the dynamic specification 
(given that results presented in Table 6 show that the contagion variable is significant precisely at 
lags 5 and 6). 
Since part of the motivation of most papers in the literature is to actually predict crises and not 
just understand the sign and significance of a variable, a word has to be said of the predictive 
power of the model. In a nutshell, the model does not fare well compared to Bussière and 
Fratzscher (2002), and to some of the other models therein reviewed. This is due to the fact that 
the model is designed to make a statement about the precise timing of the crisis, which is very 
difficult. In the dynamic model lags 5 and 6 were found significant: it means that for many 
countries a crisis follows another in a six month interval. Yet, this empirical regularity is not 
matched by all countries, for which the model mistakenly predicts a rise in the probability of a 
crisis 5 and 6 months after a crisis has burst out. To bypass this problem we need to adapt the 
model, which is the purpose of section 5. 
 
5.  Results based on a transformed crisis index: extending the 
prediction window 
The results presented in the last section conveyed important messages. However, in terms of 
prediction the model fared relatively poorly. This is because the model attempted to achieve 
something that may simply be infeasible: predict the timing of a crisis. Perhaps a different way to 
formulate the question would allow to still retrieve some useful information on when a crisis may 
happen. This is for instance the approach chosen by Fuertes and Kalotychou (2004), who also 
review the literature on the subject. 
If, instead of trying to predict which month a crisis may happen, one is willing to extend the 
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and regress this forward crisis index on the contemporaneous fundamentals Xi
t. Using this 
definition of the variables we are sure that what appears on the right-hand side does not appear 
                                                           
28 It also suggests that results for the effect of the lending boom variable are simply not very robust, as noticed 
already in a cross-section context (Bussière and Mulder, 1999). 
29 This definition corresponds to the periods where the crisis index is equal to one in Bussière and Fratzscher (2006). 
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simultaneously on the left-hand side: the statement the model makes is that the magnitude of the 
exchange rate over-appreciation now (to take just one example) can determine the likelihood of a 
strong depreciation in any of the successive 12 months. The question the model is tackling is then: 
are fundamentals in the 12 months preceding a crisis different from what they are the rest of the 
time? Results broadly confirm the results from Section 4 regarding the significance of the main 
variables (Table 7), the main difference being that the growth variable now has a significant 
coefficient. 
What is a dynamic panel in this setting? Clearly lagging the crisis index 1, 2 or 6 months would 
not bring any interesting information since the independent variable would by construction 
coincide with the lagged dependent variable during 11, 10 or 6 months respectively. The solution 
is to lag the dependent variable 12 months. This method also allows one to extend the time during 
which a crisis has an effect to one year instead of just six months as in the preceding section. It 
could be extended to longer timeframe in further research. 
Results in Table 7 and 8 are qualitatively similar as those of Tables 2-5, the same variables being 
significant in both cases. However, goodness of fit is much better (see also Chart Appendix). It is 
noteworthy that with the transformed index, the dynamic model shows that the lagged dependent 
variable is not significant (implying that beyond the six month interval identified in the previous 
version, there is not much of an effect for the lagged dependent variable). Overall, this model 
would have predicted most crises, such as the 1995 and 1998 crises in Brazil, the 1998 crisis in 
Chile, the 1994 Tequila crisis in Mexico, the 1998 Russian crisis, the 1998 Asian crisis for all 
countries represented here, as well as the crises that hit Argentina and Turkey in 2001 (assuming 
of course timely publication of the indicators). It would however have missed the 1995 crisis in 
Argentina and sent a false alarm for Hungary in 1999. 
Comparing the two panels (left and right) of Table 7 provides the same insight as when 
comparing the results of Table 2 and 3: with fixed effects, the coefficient of the current account 
becomes significant and the coefficient of short-term debt is roughly twice as large. Meanwhile, 
comparing the two panels of Table 8 yields very similar conclusions to each other.
30 Similar to 
the results presented in Section 4, the coefficient of the lending boom variable becomes 
insignificant in the dynamic model specification, most likely for the same reasons as explained at 




                                                           
30 Bussiere and Fratzscher (2006), where the dependent variable is also a transformed index similar to the one used in 
Table 7 and Table 8, also concludes that fixed effects do not have a significant impact on the results. This contrasts 
with the results presented in Table 2-5 (with the untransformed index). 
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Table 7: Estimation results using the transformed crisis index, static model, with and 
without fixed effects (country dummies). 
  No fixed effects  With Fixed effects 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 












































- -  0.012 
0.002*** 







- - -  0.008 
0.001*** 
- - 
Total debt / 
Reserves (consoli- 
dated concept) 
- -  0.005 
0.001*** 




















- - -  0.061 
0.018 
- - -  0.243 
0.054*** 


















































#  obs  1741 1741 1741 1717 1417 1417 1417 1393 
Pseudo R
2  0.186 0.185 0.209 0.172 0.245 0.269 0.287 0.240 
Log likelihood  -752.04 -752.65 -730.45 -750.02 -620.19 -600.17 -585.75 -611.78 
Standard errors for the results using no fixed effects are robust corrections using countries as clusters. Fixed effects 
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Table 8: Estimation results using the transformed crisis index, dynamic model, with and 
without fixed effects (country dummies). 
  No fixed effects  With Fixed effects 































































 -  0.012 
0.002*** 







- -  0.008 
0.001*** 
- - 
Total debt / 
Reserves (consoli- 
dated concept) 
- -  0.004 
0.005 




















- - -  0.049 
0.056 
- - -  0.273 
0.056 


















































#  obs  1721 1721 1721 1697 1409 1409 1409 1385 
Pseudo R
2  0.183 0.182 0.205 0.167 0.243 0.269 0.288 0.239 









This paper has presented, for the first time in the context of financial crises in emerging market, a 
set of discrete choice models with a dynamic specification and a specification where the 
explanatory variables are tested at different lags. It has also discussed the issue of potentially 
spurious state dependence and the practice of using a dependent variable defined as a forward 
index, equal to one during a time window. 
Several conclusions can arise from this analysis. First, the early indicators used to detect crises 
ahead of time seem to perform relatively well if the purpose is to predict crises in a given time 
window; however, they are much less efficient in predicting the exact starting date of the crisis. 
Overall, the main economic variables that are found to predict crises are the ratio of short-term 
debt to international reserves, the growth rate of credit to the private sector, the over-appreciation 
of the nominal effective exchange rate (with respect to trend) and contagion from other countries. 
Second, the dynamics of currency crises appear more clearly with the models presented in 
Section 4 (with the untransformed index): often, crises happen in the same country at few months 
interval, typically 5 to 6 months. This empirical regularity would suggest that attention should not 
vanish after a crisis has happened as another one may be pending. Third, different indicators 
signal crises at different lags, some being very short-term (e.g. the short-term debt to reserves 
ratio or financial contagion), others with a longer lag (e.g. the lending boom variable or the 
degree of exchange rate over-appreciation). This suggests that when a country faces liquidity 
problems or financial contagion from crises in other emerging markets, policy reaction must be 
particularly quick (a few months at most). Interestingly, in the case of contagion, one can observe 
a switch in the sign of the variable in the long run. This could suggest that contagion is 
sometimes positive (exchange market pressure in a given country may actually decrease if a crisis 
happens in another country). This may arise if investors relocate their investments across 
emerging markets (e.g., investors may have invested more in Asia after the 1995 Tequila crisis, 
which may have temporarily decreased exchange market pressure in Asian EMEs). This line of 
analysis may be more extensively conducted in future research. Generally, future extensions of 
the present framework may more systematically select the lag structure of the explanatory 
variables. Future research may also use new econometric methods to disentangle true from 
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Country and Data Appendix 
 
Table 9: Country List 
Latin America  Asia  Eastern Europe 
Argentina China  Czech  Republic 
Brazil Hong  Kong  Estonia 
Chile India  Hungary 
Colombia Indonesia  Latvia 
Ecuador Korea  Lithuania 
Mexico Malaysia  Poland 
Peru Philippines  Russia 
Venezuela Singapore  Slovak  Republic 
 Thailand  Slovenia 
   Turkey 
 
Data sources. Five different sources have been used for the macro and financial variables: the 
IMF International Financial Statistics (IFS), the IMF-World Bank-OECD-BIS joint table for the 
debt statistics available on-line (BIS), the World Market Monitor from DRI-WEFA (WMM) / 
Global Insight, J.P. Morgan (JPM), and Datastream (DS) for the market indices. Data relative to 
Taiwan were all taken from WMM; original data come from Central Bank of China and 
Directorate General Of Budget. Data are retrieved on a monthly (M), quarterly (Q), semi-annual 
(SA) or yearly (Y) basis and linearly interpolated when necessary. 
 
 
The computation of the dependent variable was done in two steps: 
Step 1  Computation of the (continuous) Exchange Market Pressure Index 
Exchange market pressure indices (EMPI) represent a synthetic measure of the pressure against a 
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Where: 
-  RER is the real effective exchange rate (coming mostly from IFS line rec and from JP-
Morgan –the exchange rate is measured so that an increase is a depreciation; 
-  r is the real interest rate –chosen as a short-term rate (e.g. IFS line 60.$ and WMM sources); 
-  res is the level of international reserves. 
The weights sum up to 1 and correspond to the average precision of the three series (around 0.6, 
0.2 and 0.2 respectively). 
 
Step 2  Transformation of the EMPI into a Binary Variable 
The continuous EMP index is transformed into a discrete variable using a cut-off point. The 
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The independent variables were computed as follows: 










STDR =  
A rise in this ratio can come from either a rise in debt or a drop in reserves, which is exactly what 
the “Greenspan-Guidotti rule” states: reserves should cover entirely the amount of debt that can 
be sold short-term by investors in case of an attack. The long-term debt ratio was computed in the 
same fashion. The BIS database on debt statistics includes bank loans (BIS Line A), Brady Bonds 
(Line C), liabilities within one year (Line G), total liabilities, locational concept (Line J), total 
liabilities, consolidated concept (Line K). Reserves come from IFS line 1l.d (total reserves minus 
gold).  
 
Current account. The raw data come from IFS line 78ald, as well as Global Insight. The GDP 
was transformed into a monthly series using linear interpolation techniques; using industrial 
production as a complement yielded similar results. The current account was downloaded at a 
monthly frequency for some countries; when it was only available at a quarterly frequency I used 
linear interpolation techniques. Using information from the tade balance yielded very similar 
results. 
 
Government surplus. The government budget balance is referred to in the Tables as 
“government surplus” (in some papers, it actually refers to the government deficit; here, a 
positive sign does indicate a surplus). The raw data come from IFS line 80 and from Global 
Insight. It therefore represents a non-cyclically adjusted balance, also including debt repayment. 
The fact that it is not cyclically adjusted is controlled for by using also GDP growth in the 
specifications.  
 
Over-valuation relative to trend. This paper uses the International monetary Fund real effective 
exchange rate, which is a comprehensive measure including competition in third markets; it was 














The trend is a simple linear trend as is usual in the literature. It is computed over the whole 
sample to simplify and above all because of the nature of emerging markets, for which data series 
are available since the early 1990’s only. In Bussiere and Fratzscher (2006), a change in the 
exchange rate over the past 24 months is used, with similar results (although a fall in the 
predictive power of the model can be noted, the model still outperforms alternative models 
published in international journals). 
 
Lending boom. As the exact number of non-performing or bad loans in the economy is not 
directly observable for obvious under-reporting reasons, the literature has searched proxies. The 
so-called “lending boom”, that measures the increase of the credit to the private sector (CPS) over 
a 2 or 3 year period, can be useful in this respect (see Tornell, 1999). Here the measure is 



























































The credit to the private sector is measured as a percentage of the GDP to account for the size of 
the economy; the raw data come from IFS line 32b. 
 
Growth. The growth rate of real GDP is simply computed as below (monthly series were 

















Contagion. The contagion variables are defined in Bussiere and Fratzscher (2006). Contagion 
across countries can take different channels, among others financial and trade linkages. As the 
former are generally found significant and not the latter (see Bussière and Fratzscher, 2006), the 
present paper focuses only on financial contagion. The degree of financial interdependence 
between country i and country j is proxied by the cross-country correlation of equity market 
returns in country i and in country j 
31 (discounted from the impact of other fundamentals, see 
above reference for further details): 
FINCONTij = correl (µi, µj) 
 
 
Next, the measures of real or financial interdependence for each country is interacted with the 















i FINCONT EMPI CONTAGION  
 
Market indices. The market value of key stock indices (here, Datastream indices) was 
transformed into a 12 month percent change. Three indices were used: a broad market index, and 
two sub-indices on banks and financial institutions. 
 
 
                                                           
31 This correlation is measured in tranquil periods, otherwise there would be of course an endogeneity problem. 
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